Much of the encryption that protects information today relies on mathematics that a large enough quantum computer could undo. Nobody can say exactly when such a computer will exist, but national cyber security agencies have set out timetables for moving to new, quantum-resistant methods, known as post-quantum cryptography. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, for example, expects organisations to finish the move by 2035.
For most organisations, very little of that move will happen in code they write themselves. Their encryption sits inside operating systems, cloud services, network equipment, certificates and the software they buy. The move will arrive as product updates, new versions and new contracts, on their suppliers’ timetables. So one of the most useful things an organisation can do now is to ask its suppliers what their plans are, and keep asking.
In November 2026, Australia’s cyber security agency, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the US National Security Agency (NSA) published a set of questions for exactly this purpose. This guide explains why the questions matter, which suppliers to ask first, and how to turn the answers into decisions that stand up when someone asks about them later.
Ask in depth
- Keys, certificates and code signing: suppliers that manage them for you RW-SUP-01
- Long-lived information: suppliers holding what must stay confidential for years RW-SUP-01
- Equipment with encryption built in, which may not be updatable at all RW-DAT-20
Ask a shorter set
- Other suppliers that hold your data, at their next renewal or review RW-SUP-06
- New suppliers, before you sign RW-SUP-05
Follow through
- Contract terms on post-quantum plans RW-SUP-03
- Progress checked at each review RW-SUP-06
- Time-limited exceptions for anything that won’t be ready RW-GOV-29
About the RiskWitness Blueprint
The RiskWitness Blueprint is a free information security framework that we publish for organisations of every size. It sets out 249 requirements across a core and eleven areas, from identity and access to suppliers and artificial intelligence. Each requirement says what to do and why it matters, and leaves the choice of how to the organisation.
Requirements sit in three tiers, and each tier includes everything below it:
- Foundation: what every organisation should have, whatever its size, including the controls that stop the most common attacks.
- Established: a managed programme, with deeper risk work, supplier assurance, testing, monitoring and regular review.
- Advanced: for organisations with more at stake, with round-the-clock monitoring and deeper, independent testing.
The Blueprint is also proportionate. It says what to achieve, not how far to take it, so a small firm and a large one can both meet the same requirement in ways that suit their size and risks. The full framework can be downloaded free.
What the requirements ask
RW-DAT-20Established
Encryption methods agreed and kept current
Agree which encryption methods and strengths your systems may use, and replace any that become weak or outdated, including planning the move to methods that resist quantum computers.
RW-SUP-01Foundation
A list of your suppliers
Keep a list of your suppliers that records what each one provides, what data or access it has, how much harm its failure would cause you and so which of them are critical.
RW-SUP-05Established
Suppliers checked before signing
Check a new supplier's security, and the security of the software or service it will provide, before you sign with them, in proportion to the data and access they will have.
RW-SUP-03Foundation
Contracts that bind suppliers to security
Make sure your contracts with suppliers that handle your data or systems cover how they must protect them, how quickly they must tell you about a breach, your right to check, and the return or deletion of your data at the end, and where a supplier offers only standard terms, check those terms cover these points before you sign.
RW-SUP-06Established
Critical suppliers reviewed
Review each critical supplier's security regularly, including their certificates, any incidents they've had and how well they've kept to the contract.
RW-GOV-29Established
Exceptions recorded and time-limited
Allow an exception to a security policy or requirement only when its risk has been assessed and an agreed person has approved it, and record each one with the reason and an end date so it is reviewed before that date rather than left in place.
RW-DAT-20 is the one that names the move to quantum-resistant methods directly. On its own, though, it can read as a job for the IT team. The supplier requirements are what make it achievable for most organisations: knowing which suppliers provide your encryption, asking before you sign, writing what you need into the contract, and checking progress at each review. RW-GOV-29 covers the products that won’t be ready in time, so that keeping them is a decision someone has made rather than something nobody noticed.
Why they matter
Information taken today can be read later
The reason to start now, years before a capable quantum computer exists, is what NIST, the US standards body, calls “harvest now, decrypt later”. Attackers can copy encrypted information today and keep it until they’re able to decrypt it. For anything that must stay confidential for many years, such as health records, legal files, designs or government information, the risk has already begun. NIST’s report on the transition, published in final form in October 2026, sets dates under its standards for retiring today’s public-key methods (our news report has the detail).
Your move depends on your suppliers
The NCSC is plain about this. For organisations that rely on commodity platforms, “it is likely that upgrades to PQC will be delivered by your service provider”. Its timeline asks organisations to finish their discovery work and build an initial plan by 2028, and to “communicate your needs to your suppliers” as part of that. Where a managed provider runs systems for you, the NCSC says “it is important to ensure that they are also carrying out these assessment activities.” It also advises against writing your own post-quantum code: the plan should come from tested products, not home-made ones.
The joint guidance from NSA, ASD’s ACSC and CISA makes the same point from the other side. Many organisations rely on vendors, managed services and cloud providers that choose and implement cryptography for them, so an organisation’s own transition depends on its vendors’ readiness, openness and plans. Asking early, the agencies say, reduces the chance of late surprises, such as finding out that a critical product cannot support post-quantum cryptography in the time you need.
What the agencies suggest asking
The guide, “Post-quantum questions to ask your vendors”, was first published by ASD’s ACSC in July 2026 and released jointly with CISA and NSA on 4 November 2026. It offers vendor-neutral questions for buying, renewing contracts and ongoing supplier checks, grouped under five phases. Examples of the kind of thing it asks:
- Finding the cryptography. Does the vendor keep a current inventory of where its products use cryptography? Is any of it hard-coded or built into hardware, so it can’t simply be updated?
- Assessing the risk. How long does the vendor assume the information its product handles must stay protected?
- Deciding what comes first. Which products will be ready in time for customers to roll them out before the end of 2030? Will they support hybrid modes, combining old and new methods, during the transition, and when will they move to new methods only?
- Making the change. Which post-quantum algorithms will be supported, and when? How will key management and certificates change? Is post-quantum support included in the standard licence, or charged extra?
- Communicating. How will the vendor retire today’s methods, and how will it tell customers?
The agencies don’t expect every question to go to every supplier. The guidance says to fit the depth of questioning to the supplier’s risk, and that a weak answer “does not necessarily indicate unacceptable risk”. Answers are weighed against how sensitive and long-lived the information is, and how openly the supplier engages. The 2030 milestone reflects Australia’s own transition objectives; the guidance asks organisations to follow the timetable that applies in their own country and sector.
How to meet them
Start with the suppliers whose products protect your most important or longest-lived information, and those that handle encryption keys, certificates or code signing for you. Everyone else can come later, with a shorter set of questions.
A small organisation
Typical set-up
Cloud email and file storage, an accounting service, a website on a hosting service, and an IT supplier who looks after laptops and the office network.
What it could look like
- Note which of your suppliers hold information that must stay confidential for years, such as client files or personal data.
- At the next renewal of each, ask a few plain questions: do you have a plan for post-quantum cryptography, when will it reach us, and will it cost extra?
- Ask your IT supplier about the network equipment and remote access it manages for you, and when any of it will need replacing.
- Keep the answers with each supplier’s record, and ask again at the next review.
A larger organisation
Typical set-up
Many software and cloud suppliers, its own certificate authority or certificate management service, hardware security modules, network equipment across sites, and software signed for release.
What it could look like
- Agree which encryption methods your systems may use, and add the move to quantum-resistant methods to that standard, with dates that follow your national guidance.
- Send the full set of questions to suppliers that handle keys, certificates, signing or long-lived information, and a shorter set to the rest.
- Add post-quantum plans to the checks you make before signing, and to the security terms in new and renewed contracts.
- Review progress at each critical supplier review, and record a time-limited exception, with an owner, for anything that won’t be ready in time.
How to show it’s done
When leadership, an auditor or a customer asks how you’re preparing, useful evidence includes:
- An agreed list of the encryption methods your systems may use, including the plan for moving to quantum-resistant ones.
- A list of suppliers showing which provide or manage encryption for you, and which hold information that must stay confidential for years.
- Each priority supplier’s answers about its post-quantum plans, with the date they were given.
- Contract terms, for new and renewed contracts, that cover the supplier’s plans and how it will tell you about changes.
- Supplier reviews that record progress against those plans.
- For each product that won’t be ready in time, a recorded exception with the reason, who approved it and when it will be looked at again.
Where it usually falls short
Treating it as an IT project only
Asking everyone everything
Accepting a general assurance
Forgetting equipment with a long life
Asking once
How RiskWitness helps
RiskWitness is a hosted information security risk register. It ships with the Blueprint built in, with starter controls already mapped to its requirements. Suppliers are on the Team plan and above, as are the Blueprint’s Established tier, which most of these requirements are in, and risk acceptance is on every plan.
Know which suppliers matter
Record each supplier with what it provides, an owner, the information it handles and the access it has. RiskWitness works out how critical each one is from a few questions. Note which suppliers provide or manage encryption for you, and link them to the assets and services that depend on them.Ask the questions
Add your own post-quantum questions to the supplier questionnaires, choosing which levels each goes into: the detailed one for suppliers that handle your keys or long-lived information, a lighter one for the rest. The supplier answers through a private link, and you review the answers. Keep any roadmap or statement they send as assurance evidence.Record the risk
Add a risk for information protected by encryption that a quantum computer could break, linked to the suppliers and assets concerned, with an owner. Score it before and after controls, and choose a treatment.Make it a control, and map it
Add controls such as “Approved encryption methods, with a post-quantum plan” and “Supplier post-quantum plans checked at each review”. Map them to RW-DAT-20 and the supplier requirements above, and test them on a schedule. RiskWitness shows how well each requirement is met.Follow up in contracts and reviews
Record each contract’s security terms, and schedule supplier reviews. Turn follow-ups into actions with owners and due dates, such as asking again at renewal or replacing equipment that can’t be updated.Record exceptions properly
If a product won’t be ready in time, record the risk acceptance with a reason and an expiry date. Outside your tolerance, a named approver signs it off.Keep leadership informed
Produce a PDF report or slide deck on your risks, your suppliers’ readiness and the actions still open.
Every step is kept in a history that shows who did what, when, and the old and new values, and nobody can edit or delete it. When leadership, an auditor, a customer or a regulator asks how you’re preparing for post-quantum cryptography, and what your suppliers told you, the answer is already written down.
Sources
- NSA releases guidance to evaluate third-party PQC readiness, Intelligence Community News, 5 November 2026, reporting the NSA’s announcement of 4 November 2026
- Post-Quantum Questions to Ask Your Vendors: The NSA, CISA and ASD Checklist, Encryption Consulting, 12 November 2026
- Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography, National Cyber Security Centre (UK), first published 20 March 2025
- NIST report provides guidelines for the transition to post-quantum cryptography, NIST, 27 October 2026, updated 2 November 2026
