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NIST sets the timetable for moving to post-quantum cryptography

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published the final version of NIST IR 8547, “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards”. The final version appeared on 27 October 2026, replacing a draft from November 2024.

The report is NIST’s road map for moving away from public-key algorithms that a large quantum computer could break. It sets dates that apply under NIST standards and guidelines. NIST describes it as a blueprint for critical infrastructure owners and operators and other organisations, not only US federal agencies.

What’s changing

Two dates. In NIST’s words, it “will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow its use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035.”

  • Deprecated means the algorithm may still be used, “but the user must accept some security risk”.
  • Disallowed means it is no longer allowed for the stated purpose.

What’s covered. For signatures, it lists ECDSA and RSA at 112 bits of security or more, and EdDSA at 128 bits or more. For key establishment, it lists finite field Diffie-Hellman and MQV, elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman and MQV, and RSA. All are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035.

Stricter than the draft. According to an analysis by PostQuantum.com, the 2024 draft deprecated only the 112-bit algorithms after 2030. The final report extends this to stronger ones too, such as P-256, RSA-3072 and Ed25519.

The replacements. NIST has published three post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for signatures. It recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default. A standard for HQC-KEM, a backup to ML-KEM, is in development, as is a signature standard derived from FALCON.

Symmetric algorithms stay. NIST does not expect to move away from AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 as part of this migration.

US federal dates. US federal high value assets and high impact systems need post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030. Signatures follow by 31 December 2031. These come from Executive Order 14412 and OMB memorandum M-26-15, both from June 2026.

What it means for you

NIST says organisations “should treat the migration to PQC as a current operational priority.” The report’s own advice gives a sensible order:

  • Make a cryptographic inventory. Find where your systems and suppliers use the algorithms listed above.
  • Start with long-lived secrets. Adversaries can collect encrypted data now and decrypt it later. NIST calls this “harvest now, decrypt later”. NIST says systems protecting data with long-term confidentiality needs “warrant the earliest transitions”.
  • Look at TLS early. NIST calls it an early migration priority. It says TLS 1.3 offers a practical near-term path, including hybrid post-quantum key exchange.
  • Find what can’t move. Systems that cannot support post-quantum cryptography should be identified and prioritised for replacement or retirement.
  • Don’t leave signatures until last. They aren’t exposed to that threat. But NIST says their transition takes longer and needs more coordination.
  • Build in agility. Aim to change algorithms without rebuilding systems.

How RiskWitness helps

Record the risk. Add a risk for quantum-vulnerable cryptography, with an owner. Score likelihood and impact before and after controls, add a cost range, and set a review date.

Link it to your assets. Connect the risk to the assets that rely on these algorithms, with their owners and where they’re hosted. Your inventory and your risk then sit side by side.

Ask your suppliers. Rate each supplier by criticality. Send a questionnaire about their post-quantum plans and keep the assurance evidence they return.

Map the control. Record your cryptography control with an owner, link it to the risk, and test it. Map it to the requirements in the framework library, such as those on cryptography in NIST SP 800-53 and ISO/IEC 27001:2022.

Plan the work. Turn each step into an action with an owner and a due date, working back from 2030. Overdue actions show on the dashboard.

Decide on what stays. After 2030, using a deprecated algorithm means accepting a risk. Record that acceptance with a reason and an expiry well before 2035. Outside tolerance, a named approver signs it off and confirms it’s them.

Report it. Produce a PDF report or slide deck for the board, and record the committee’s decisions in its meeting minutes.

Every step is kept in a history that shows who did what, when, and the old and new values. Nobody can edit or delete it. When the board, an auditor, a customer or a regulator asks how you are handling the move, the record is already there.

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