Many organisations have at least one piece of software that can reach every computer they own. It might be a remote monitoring and management tool that an IT provider uses to patch and fix machines, or a remote support tool that lets the service desk take control of a screen. These tools are useful because they are trusted everywhere: they can install software, run scripts and open sessions on laptops, servers and backup systems alike.
That same trust makes them valuable to attackers. Whoever controls the console controls everything it manages, and the activity looks like routine IT work. Many organisations don’t sign in to these tools themselves, and some don’t know which ones their provider uses, so a problem with one can reach them before they know it was there.
This guide looks at how to keep that trust under control, using five requirements from the RiskWitness Blueprint: knowing which tools you have, limiting what your provider can do with them, watching what is done, stopping unapproved tools from running, and planning for the day a tool has to be switched off.
Who can sign in
- Your own IT team, each with their own account and multi-factor sign-in
- Your IT provider's staff, with access only for the agreed work, and a record of what they do RW-SUP-02
- An attacker with a stolen password, or a flaw in the tool itself
The console
- One approved tool, on your list of software and services, with an owner RW-DEV-02
- What admins did with it, reviewed regularly, so a session nobody can explain is followed up RW-IDA-19
Every managed device
- Laptops, servers, backups and anything else the tool can reach
- A second, unapproved remote tool planted by an attacker: not allowed to run RW-DEV-15
- The day the tool is switched off: a plan agreed in advance with the provider RW-SUP-15
- Approved and controlled
- Blocked
- Planned for in advance
- Attackers
About the RiskWitness Blueprint
The RiskWitness Blueprint is a free information security framework that we publish for organisations of every size. It sets out 249 requirements across a core and eleven areas, from identity and access to suppliers and artificial intelligence. Each requirement says what to do and why it matters, and leaves the choice of how to the organisation.
Requirements sit in three tiers, and each tier includes everything below it:
- Foundation: what every organisation should have, whatever its size, including the controls that stop the most common attacks.
- Established: a managed programme, with deeper risk work, supplier assurance, testing, monitoring and regular review.
- Advanced: for organisations with more at stake, with round-the-clock monitoring and deeper, independent testing.
The Blueprint is also proportionate. It says what to achieve, not how far to take it, so a small firm and a large one can both meet the same requirement in ways that suit their size and risks. The full framework can be downloaded free.
What the requirements ask
RW-DEV-02Foundation
A list of the software and services you run
Keep a current list of the software installed on your devices and servers, and of the cloud services you use, showing the version of each where it has one and who looks after it.
RW-SUP-02Foundation
Supplier access limited to the job
Give a supplier access to your systems only for the work you've agreed with them, keep a record of what they do while connected, and remove the access as soon as that work is finished or the person using it stops working on it.
RW-DEV-15Established
Only approved programs can run
Let laptops, desktops and servers run only programs, scripts, installer files, software libraries and drivers that you have approved.
RW-IDA-19Established
Admin activity reviewed
Review a record of what admin accounts have done at regular intervals, and follow up any action that has no clear reason.
RW-SUP-15Advanced
Critical suppliers in your incident plans
Agree with each critical supplier how you will work together during an incident or outage, and write their contacts and role into your incident and recovery plans.
The first two are Foundation requirements: every organisation should know which remote tools it runs, and every supplier’s access should be limited to the job and recorded. The next two are Established, because they need a running process: an approved list that devices enforce, and a regular look at what admin accounts have done. The last is Advanced, because agreeing incident arrangements with each critical supplier takes effort that pays off most where more is at stake. Taken together, they turn a tool that is trusted by default into one that is trusted on terms you have set.
Why they matter
Attackers like tools that are already trusted
In January 2023, CISA, the NSA and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center published a joint advisory on the malicious use of remote monitoring and management software. They explain why attackers favour it: it can serve as a backdoor for persistent access, it lets them avoid using custom malware, and its use generally doesn’t trigger antivirus or antimalware defences. Portable versions, which run without being installed, can bypass both the need for administrator rights and the policies that control which software is allowed.
A few months later, in June 2023, CISA, the FBI, the NSA, the MS-ISAC and the Israel National Cyber Directorate published a guide to securing remote access software. It describes the software as giving malicious actors “easy and broad access to victim systems”, and its recommendations begin where this guide does: audit the remote access software you have, establish what normal use looks like, allow only the tools you have approved, and review the logs.
A provider’s tool reaches all its customers
Managed service providers look after many customers’ systems at once, usually through one console. In May 2022, the cyber security agencies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States said they expect attackers to increase their targeting of managed service providers, against both provider and customer networks. They advised customers to make security a term of their contracts, and to expect their provider to secure remote access with multi-factor authentication, monitor and log activity, and keep a tested incident response plan.
What that looks like in practice became clear in 2026. In August, attackers used an authentication bypass in N-able’s N-central, CVE-2026-18577, to take over an administrator account on the server. They then used its Take Control feature to connect to the devices it managed, and registered a Cloudflare Tunnel service on those devices, which let them keep access after their access to the server was removed. Sophos, as reported by Help Net Security, found one attacker using an N-central server to reach a backup server, domain controllers and application servers. Separately, BeyondTrust says two compromises of its Remote Support product, CVE-2026-102764, began on 29 August 2026; one was an instance BeyondTrust hosted itself, which it found and contained on 28 September.
Sometimes the tool has to be switched off
The other lesson of 2026 is that a remote management tool can disappear overnight. On 9 November, after an independent researcher published 33 critical flaws in N-central with working exploits, N-able took its hosted N-central offline and asked customers who run it themselves to take their servers offline until it confirmed they were safe to bring back. N-able said it had seen no active exploitation at that point. For organisations whose IT provider uses N-central, patching, monitoring and remote fixes through it had to wait until it was safe to bring back. That is the right decision in the circumstances, and it is much easier to live with if the organisation already knows the tool is there and has agreed with its provider what happens without it.
How to meet them
How far an organisation takes these requirements depends on its size, how much it relies on remote tools and the risks it faces.
A small organisation
Typical set-up
Around twenty laptops, cloud email and files, and an IT provider who looks after everything remotely.
What it could look like
- Ask your IT provider which remote management and remote support tools they use on your devices, and add them to your list of software and services, with your contact at the provider as the person who looks after each.
- Agree in writing that they use only those tools, with multi-factor sign-in for every technician, and that they will tell you about security incidents of their own, within an agreed time.
- Ask for a short report of their remote sessions on your devices every few months, and query anything you don’t recognise.
- Agree what they will do, and what you will do, if their tool has to be switched off for a few days.
A larger organisation
Typical set-up
Hundreds of devices across several sites, an internal IT team, and one or more providers with their own remote tools.
What it could look like
- Keep one list of every approved remote tool, internal and supplier, with an owner, and use application control so that nothing else, including portable versions, can run.
- Give each provider its own named accounts, limited to the systems in its contract, with access recorded and removed when the work or the person changes.
- Collect the tools’ own logs centrally, and review admin activity on a schedule, following up any session or script that has no clear reason.
- Write each critical provider’s contacts, its role and the fallback for losing its tool into your incident and recovery plans, and rehearse them.
How to show it’s done
Leadership, auditors and customers will want to see more than a list of suppliers. Useful evidence includes:
- A current list of the remote management and remote support tools in use, including those your providers use, each with an owner.
- The contract terms that limit each provider’s access and require them to tell you about their own incidents.
- A record of recent reviews of admin activity in those tools, with what was followed up.
- The application control rules, or the supplier’s confirmation, that only approved remote tools can run.
- Your incident and recovery plans, showing each critical provider’s contacts and what happens if its tool is unavailable.
Where it usually falls short
Not knowing the tool is there
One provider, many customers
More than one remote tool
Logs nobody reads
No plan for losing the tool
How RiskWitness helps
RiskWitness is a hosted information security risk register. It ships with the Blueprint built in, with starter controls already mapped to its requirements, and it can be used to manage these five requirements from start to finish. Suppliers and assets are on the Team plan and above, which also includes all three tiers of the Blueprint, as RW-DEV-15, RW-IDA-19 and RW-SUP-15 need.
Record the provider as a supplier
Add your IT provider as a supplier and answer four questions about the information it holds, the access it has, how much you depend on it and how hard it would be to replace. Privileged access makes it Critical, and RiskWitness suggests reviewing it every six months.Check the contract and the access
Record which security clauses are in the contract, such as telling you about its security incidents within an agreed time, and file its assurance evidence with expiry dates. The onboarding checklist confirms its accounts were set up with only what it needs, and the exit checklist confirms they were removed.Record the tool as an asset
Add each remote management or support tool as an asset, with the person responsible for it and where it’s hosted, linked to the supplier, the risks and the controls that protect it.Record the risk
Add a risk for a remote management tool being misused or unavailable, with an owner. Score it before and after controls, choose how it will be treated, and link it to the supplier.Make the safeguards controls, and test them
Add controls such as “Only approved remote tools can run”, “Quarterly review of remote sessions” and “Provider fallback plan agreed”, map each to its Blueprint requirement, and record every test with its result. RiskWitness shows how well each requirement is met.Give each gap an owner
When a review finds something unexplained, or the provider hasn’t answered, create an action with an owner and a due date. Overdue actions show on the dashboard.Record the incident, if it happens
If your provider’s tool is compromised or switched off, record an incident linked to the supplier, the asset, the risk and the controls, with who is handling it and which regulators may need telling.
Every step is kept in a history that shows who did what, when, and the old and new values, and nobody can edit or delete it. When leadership, an auditor, a customer or a regulator asks which tools can reach your computers and who controls them, the answer is already written down.
Sources
- Protecting against malicious use of remote monitoring and management software (AA23-025A), CISA, NSA and MS-ISAC, 25 January 2023
- Guide to securing remote access software, CISA, FBI, NSA, MS-ISAC and INCD, June 2023
- CISA and partners release joint guide to securing remote access software, CISA, 6 June 2023
- Joint cybersecurity advisory: protecting against cyber threats to managed service providers and their customers, CISA, with the NSA, FBI, NCSC-UK, ACSC, CCCS and NCSC-NZ, May 2022
- Choosing a managed service provider (MSP), NCSC (UK), 24 November 2025
- Attackers exploit N-able N-central flaw to reach managed endpoints (CVE-2026-18577), Help Net Security, 3 August 2026, updated 10 August 2026
- CVE-2026-102764: critical BeyondTrust Remote Support authentication bypass exploited in the wild, Rapid7, 19 October 2026
- N-able disables cloud services following disclosure of “Able2Shell” exploit chains, Huntress, 9 November 2026
- N-able takes N-central cloud offline after researcher discloses 33 zero-days with PoC exploits, The Hacker News, 10 November 2026
