On 19 November 2026, the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published proposed guidance on cyber risk and resilience. It sets out how financial firms should manage cyber risk and show they can recover from severe attacks. Comments close on 26 February 2027.
The guidance is for UK financial firms. But its central question applies anywhere: if an attack destroyed your core systems, could you rebuild them?
What’s changing
The guidance brings together existing requirements and lessons from supervision. FCA chief executive Nikhil Rathi said: “Our response shouldn’t always be more rules.” He said firms had asked for clarity on what good cyber resilience looks like.
The guidance draws on the Cyber Assessment Framework of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). According to the Press Association, it covers:
- cyber risk built into governance and risk management, with clear roles and board and senior management oversight
- protecting critical IT infrastructure
- identity and access management
- data protection
- controls over third parties and supply chains
- detecting and responding to incidents, and learning lessons from them.
City AM reports more detail. Firms should assume a major attack will get through their defences. Their response and recovery plans should include fully rebuilding core banking systems, without relying on backups that may be compromised. Where proportionate, recovery should be tested beyond tabletop exercises. Firms should also map weaknesses across their supply chain, including open source software. And firms stay responsible when outsourced technology fails.
In a speech on 18 November, PRA chief executive Katharine Braddick said the regulators want “greater assurance that firms can recover from severe cyber disruption”. That includes “scenarios that could require a material rebuild of their technology environments”. She said these issues will get “a materially greater weight” in supervision.
Alongside the guidance, the regulators published “effective practices” on cyber risks from AI and the possible arrival of quantum computing. That material is not open for formal consultation.
What it means for you
If you are a UK financial firm, read the consultation and decide whether to respond by 26 February 2027. The regulators will supervise firms against the final guidance.
If you are not, the proposals still make a useful test. These RiskWitness Blueprint requirements cover the same ground:
- RW-RES-16 Whole systems rebuilt in rehearsal (Advanced). “Rehearse rebuilding at least one critical system from nothing to a known clean state, using only your backups and your recovery plan.” This is the “bare metal rebuild” the regulators describe.
- RW-RES-15 Backups checked before a restore (Advanced). “Check that a backup is complete and free of malware or tampering before you restore from it after an attack.”
- RW-RES-03 A backup copy attackers can’t reach (Foundation). Without one, there may be nothing to rebuild from.
- RW-SUP-15 Critical suppliers in your incident plans (Advanced). A rebuild often depends on suppliers. Agree their part before you need it.
- RW-SUP-07 Supplier risks in your risk register (Established). “Record the security risks that each critical supplier brings in your risk register, and assess and treat them alongside your other risks.”
- RW-DET-20 Lessons taken from each incident (Established). The guidance asks for processes that find and act on lessons learned.
- RW-GOV-15 Leadership kept informed (Established). Oversight from the top runs through the whole guidance.
How RiskWitness helps
“What does the guidance ask of us?” Frameworks. Add the guidance as one of your own frameworks by pasting in its requirements from your copy. Map your controls to each one. A control can count towards the Blueprint and the guidance at the same time. RiskWitness shows how well each requirement is met.
“Could we rebuild from nothing?” Risks and Controls. Record the risk of an attack that destroys your core systems, with an owner and scores before and after controls. Link the controls that reduce it, such as protected backups, backup checks and rebuild rehearsals. Record each rehearsal as a control test, with its result.
“Who would we depend on?” Assets and Suppliers. Record your critical systems as assets, with where they are hosted and the suppliers behind them. Rate each supplier’s criticality, keep their assurance evidence and note the contract clauses that cover recovery.
“What will we change?” Actions. Turn each gap into an action with an owner and a due date. Overdue actions show on the dashboard.
“Does leadership know where we stand?” Reports and Meetings. Give leadership a PDF report or slide deck. Record the committee meeting, its minutes and its decisions.
Every step is kept in a history that nobody can edit or delete. When leadership, an auditor, a customer or a regulator asks how you would recover, the record is ready.
Sources
- Transparency and predictability: a foundation for future resilience, speech by Katharine Braddick, Bank of England, 18 November 2026
- Financial regulators clarify cyber resilience expectations as threats grow, Press Association (via The Irish News), 19 November 2026
- Be ready to rebuild from scratch after cyberattacks, UK watchdogs tell banks, City AM, 19 November 2026
- UK regulators propose new cyber resilience guidance for financial firms, Brit Brief, 18 November 2026
