Most software is now built and released automatically. Each change to the code goes through a pipeline that tests, packages and often deploys it. To do that, the pipeline holds keys to cloud accounts and other services. This week an attacker went after those keys.
What happened
GitHub is where many organisations keep their code. GitHub Actions is its built-in way of running automated builds, called workflows.
From about 12:45 UTC on 10 November 2026, an attacker used stolen GitHub sign-in tokens to push malicious code into repositories. Aikido Security, a company that checks software for security problems, counted 4,837 accounts involved. SafeDep, another company that studies attacks on open-source software, counted 4,833.
Each attack began with a test pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes”, to check that the account could make changes. Aikido found these in 61,764 repositories, many reached through collaborator or organisation access.
The attacker then added a secret stealer to a workflow, or to an install script that runs when the code’s dependencies are installed. SafeDep counted 8,093 repositories that received malicious commits by 04:36 UTC on 12 November. Aikido found signs that the stealer had run in at least 1,806 of them.
The stealer took:
- the workflow’s secrets and access tokens
- keys for cloud services, including AWS, Azure and Google Cloud
- keys for AI services and package registries
- copies of the repository and its recent build files
It also tried to keep a way back in. In AWS it could create new access keys and change who may use a role. In Azure it could add a way to sign in that keeps working after other secrets are changed.
The attacker usually reverted each change within a minute and deleted the logs, so a branch can look clean where the stealer ran. Neither company says how the attacker got the account tokens.
A few published packages picked up the stealer too, including version 3.14.3 of neuronai-studio on Packagist.
What to do now
These steps come from Aikido and SafeDep.
- Check your repositories for a branch named
wfx-docsor a pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes”. Either means an account with access has been compromised. - Look for gaps in workflow history. A missing run number can mean the stealer ran and its logs were deleted.
- Revoke the account’s access. Revoke its tokens, app permissions, SSH keys and sessions, and turn on two-factor sign-in.
- If the stealer ran, assume every secret its workflows could reach is stolen. Change them all: repository, environment and organisation secrets.
- Check your cloud accounts for new access keys, changed role trust settings in AWS, and unknown federated credentials named
wfx-ci-in Azure. - Treat any machine that installed an affected package version as compromised, and change its keys.
These Blueprint requirements cover the same ground:
- RW-DEV-22 Source code and build tools protected (Established). Limit who can change your code, and the tools that build and release it, to the people who currently work on it.
- RW-IDA-02 Multi-factor sign-in (Foundation). Require a second factor for code hosting accounts, so a stolen password isn’t enough.
- RW-IDA-12 Machine credentials owned and protected (Established). Give every pipeline key a named owner and only the access it needs, so a stolen one can do far less.
- RW-DEV-20 Third-party code kept free of known flaws (Established). Check the packages your software uses, and update or replace any that are affected.
How RiskWitness helps
“Are we affected?” Suppliers and Assets. Record your code hosting service as a supplier, and your main repositories and pipelines as assets with owners. You then know which repositories to check, and who checks each.
“What could they have taken?” Assets and Controls. Link each pipeline to the cloud accounts it can reach, so you can see what one stolen pipeline would expose. Add a control for machine credentials with a named owner, and record each test of it.
“Has anyone got in?” Actions and Incidents. Turn the checks above into actions with owners and due dates. Overdue actions show on the dashboard. If you find the stealer ran, record an incident linked to the repository, the pipeline and the supplier. RiskWitness shows which regulators may need telling, and by when.
“What will we change?” Risks, Controls and Reports. Record a risk that a build pipeline leaks its keys, scored before and after controls. Map the controls to the RiskWitness Blueprint requirements above, and record how each test went. Then produce a PDF report or slide deck for leadership.
Every step is kept in a history that shows who did what, when, and the old and new values. Nobody can edit or delete it. When leadership, an auditor, a customer or a regulator asks how you responded, the answer is already written down.
Sources
- wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories, Aikido Security, 12 November 2026
- wfx: GitHub Actions Credential Stealer Hits 8,000 Repos, SafeDep, 12 November 2026
- Attacker Used 4,837 Hijacked GitHub Accounts to Run a CI Secret Stealer in 1,806+ Repositories, The Hacker News, 12 November 2026
