News and insights

Cursor: a key leaked at its AI provider led to a backdoored coding extension

Cursor is a widely used code editor with built-in AI. On 13 November 2026 it published the findings of a two-week investigation. The trail runs from a supplier’s mistake to a backdoor on developers’ computers. It starts at Fireworks AI, whose breach we covered last week.

What happened

Cursor used Fireworks AI to run some AI models, and shared data with it through a read-only storage area. Fireworks exposed an access key that Cursor had given it. An attacker used that key to copy the stored data.

The data held records of AI coding sessions, mostly from 2025, from users who had not turned on Privacy Mode. Some records contained passwords and keys in plain text. With those, the attacker reached some of the online tools Cursor uses. They took archived source code, some customer support data and contact details, and some credentials customers had sent to support.

On 29 October 2026, the attacker used a stolen credential to place malicious copies of Anthropic’s Claude Code extension in Cursor’s extension marketplace. An extension is an add-on that runs inside the editor. The affected versions were 2.1.312 and 2.1.313. They were available for about 11 hours before Cursor removed them. Cursor estimates that up to 5,000 users may have received them.

BleepingComputer reports that the altered extension collected system information and added the attacker’s SSH key, which allows remote sign-in. It also tried to turn on SSH access and to keep that access after a restart. Coding errors probably stopped it working on many Windows and Mac computers.

Cursor says its live systems, the Cursor app and its official updates were not affected. Anthropic did not publish the malicious versions, and the open marketplace Cursor draws on (Open VSX) never carried them. The last attacker activity was seen, and blocked, on 1 November.

Cursor has moved all its AI work off Fireworks, changed every internal credential and rebuilt its marketplace.

Anyone who installed or updated to those versions during the window should follow Cursor’s security notice. Cursor warns that uninstalling alone may not be enough. Customers told about exposed keys should change them; team administrators received lists of the keys.

Wiz, a cloud security company, counted at least nine AI developer platforms that disclosed incidents in October 2026. It calls the month “Black October”.

What to do now

Developers’ tools are suppliers too, and so are their suppliers. These RiskWitness Blueprint requirements are the ones this story tests.

  • RW-SUP-13 Subcontractors known and held to the same standard (Advanced). Ask critical suppliers which subcontractors handle your data, and how they hold them to account.
  • RW-SUP-11 Software and equipment from trusted sources (Established). Get software only from the maker or another source you trust, and check that it is genuine.
  • RW-DEV-11 Software installed only with approval (Established). Editor extensions are software. Decide who may install them, and from where.
  • RW-IDA-12 Machine credentials owned and protected (Established). Give every API key an owner and keep it in a secure store, not in chats, messages or support tickets.
  • RW-AIM-01 Clear rules on what goes into AI (Foundation). Keys pasted into AI coding sessions ended up in a supplier’s storage. Tell staff plainly what may go into AI tools.

How RiskWitness helps

“Are we affected?” Suppliers and Assets. Record Cursor, or whichever coding tools you use, as suppliers with their criticality. Note the AI providers they rely on. Link them to the developer laptops and code repositories they touch.

“What do our suppliers do with our data?” Suppliers. Send a questionnaire asking which subcontractors process your data, and what settings like Privacy Mode change. Store the answers and evidence, with a review date.

“What is the risk, and who owns it?” Risks. Add a risk that a developer tool, or its supplier, exposes credentials or ships altered software. Give it an owner, score it and choose a treatment.

“Has anyone got in?” Incidents and Actions. If any developer received the affected versions, record an incident with who is handling it. Link the supplier and the laptops. RiskWitness shows which regulators may need telling, with their deadlines. Give each clean-up step, such as checking SSH keys and changing exposed keys, an action with an owner and a due date.

“What will we change?” Controls and Policies. Add controls for approved extensions and for storing keys securely. Link your rules on AI use. Map each control to the requirements above, and record tests and their results.

“What do we tell leadership?” Reports. Produce a PDF report or slide deck.

Every step is kept in a history that shows who did what and when, with the old and new values. Nobody can edit or delete it. When leadership, an auditor, a customer or a regulator asks how you manage your suppliers’ suppliers, the answer is already written down.

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